TO RISE WITH ONE MIND:
THE BAILUNDO WAR OF 1902

Douglas C. Wheeler & C. Diane Christensen
In 1902, a dispute over a rum debt between an important councillor of the African kingdom of Bailundu and a local Portuguese trader swelled into open violence on the Benguela plateau of central Angola. The ensuing war, lasting in some of the surrounding districts for more than two years, saw the mobilization for war of at least three African kingdoms (with a force of some 10,000 warriors) against three Portuguese columns of about 750 European, Boer and African troops, and 1,000 porters. Although the Portuguese forces enjoyed the advantages of superior weapons, fighting conditions and additional resources, local resistance lasted for much longer than expected and probably cost at least 2,000 lives before sporadic fighting ended in outlying areas in 1904.

The 1902 Bailundu War was the earliest in a series of movements of African resistance against expanded and intensified Portuguese colonial rule in 20th century Angola. In Portuguese accounts, the 1902 campaign was ranked as one of the bloodiest during the "pacification era", a time of other major campaigns in Congo (1913-14), Cuanhama (1914-15), Dembos (1917-19), Ambaim and Selles (1917-18), and elsewhere. But to call the war merely an explosion directed against the Portuguese government or against Europeans in general - both of which it was at least to some extent - is to oversimplify the movement and its roots. To the African peoples on the central plateau, the war marked a watershed in a general crisis, a crisis beginning in the last decades of the 19th century and perhaps not yet resolved. It involved the disintegration of the traditional world and experience of Bailundu and its neighbors.

**Part I: The Setting**

The "Nano", as the Benguela highlands were called by early European observers, is a beautiful country. Lying at an altitude of roughly 4 to 6 thousand feet, the area forms the catchment basin for central Angola’s most important rivers. The Nano enjoys a temperate climate, described by one 19th century Portuguese observer as a "perpetual springtime", but nonetheless lies in the tropical zone where malaria and other tropical diseases (though not the tsetse fly) are endemic. Mean annual rainfall varies from 40 to 60 inches, falling from October to April. Communications are usually disrupted at least during the heavier rains at the end of this wet season.

The Nano is the homeland for Angola’s largest ethnic group, the Umbundu tribe (plural form: Ovimbundu), which until the 20th century was organized into some 22 kingdoms, the largest and perhaps most powerful of which was Bailundu. The kingdom of Bailundu grew up in the Northwestern corner of the Nano, bordering upon the other Umbundu kingdoms of Bihe to the East and Wambu (called Huambo by the Portuguese) to the South. To the North and West of Bailundu, important natural borders were the Cuanza River as it flowed westward toward the sea, and the escarpment rising from sea level to form the plateau. From the edge of the escarpment, the plateau unrolls to the east and south, across the hilly country of Bailundu, toward the center of the continent and source in the past of the Nano’s staple trade commodities of slaves, ivory
beeswax, rubber, and other raw materials. The highlands abounded in forested lands and wildlife during earlier times, but by 1900 the elephant herds had disappeared and the woodlands were turning into grasslands. Deposits of copper and iron were present and iron was mined and worked locally as early as the 17th century. Salt, an important trade item, was available from neighboring peoples to the northwest and west.

The Ovimbundu are the principal group to inhabit the plateau and today number between 1 1/2 and 2 million. Their borders coincide roughly with those of the highland proper (above 5 thousand feet in altitude). Sometime around the beginning of the 17th century or earlier, the Umbundu kingdoms were formed by the merging of two groups: the Bantu-speaking peoples already resident on the plateau, and Imbangala or "Jaga" invaders from the North and Northeast. Reflections of the dual origins of the Ovimbundu were still evident at the beginning of this century, surviving in ritual, social structure, and oral tradition.

An Early Trading Center

The Nano has been a cultural and racial melting pot for at least three centuries, due to its history as a stage for continuous encounters between local Africans and outsiders entering the area to trade. The economic community of the highlands was a remarkably diverse one. Ripples spreading from the Portuguese presence, both on the coast and in the Angolan interior north of the Cuanza River, reached the Nano as early as 1600, in the form of widespread trade in European cloth, firearms, and aguardente (brandy or rum). African and mestico traders connected with the Luanda or Benguela praças (markets) reached the Nano by the mid-1600's, followed soon after by Portuguese traders and soldiers. Portuguese presídios (forts) were founded first on the Nano's edges, then in the midst of southern Umbundu territory itself by the mid-18th century (Cacinda Nova: 1769). From the 1700's on, groups of Africans and mesticos from Luanda and Benguela settled first in clusters around the presídios, then dispersed into the countryside, where they traded profitably, assimilated themselves to local African culture, and contributed a new leavening to indigenous society.

Traders of all colors soon began to enter the various kingdoms, living in areas beyond the effective reach of the Portuguese government but at times possessing their own officially-appointed priests, justices, and military chefes. These positions, with their theoretical jurisdiction over all Portuguese subjects and matters pertaining to them, were honored more in the breach than the observance. The real power was wielded either by the Umbundu suvas (kings) or sub-chiefs or by resident traders (moradores) who could muster their own private armies. At times the moradores were welcomed residents in the kingdoms and were even allowed to marry into the royal lineages. At other times, they were merely tolerated or even abused, robbed, expelled or murdered. Their ranks were continually swelled by army deserters, degredados (convicts sent to Angola for military service), and other vagabonds.
Everyone was engaged in commerce, from presídio captain-majors, common soldiers, and pombeiros (African or mulatto agents of Portuguese or Brazilian trading houses) to moradores, deserters and local Africans\textsuperscript{10}. In this atmosphere, the independent Umbundu states coexisted with the Portuguese for centuries. The kingdoms managed not only to cling to their independence until the end of the 19th century, but also to absorb culturally a number of outsiders, to conduct diplomatic relations with the Portuguese as sovereign entities\textsuperscript{11}, and to participate actively as middlemen in the economy linking Atlantic commerce with the interior of central Africa.

Early Patterns of Trade

Before the rise of the rubber trade in the 1880’s, the Nano’s export trade was based primarily on slaves, ivory, beeswax, and a miscellany of other primary products\textsuperscript{12}. Slaves were a predominant trade good throughout the 19th century. A continuing demand for labor in Angola’s plantations and cities, as well as for the plantation economies of São Tomé and Brazil, assured a ready market for slaves transported from the interior to the coast. In the latter part of the 19th century, the trade in serviços represented merely a new name for an old commodity\textsuperscript{13}. Domestic slavery among the Ovimbundu continued to exist well into the 20th century as well, resulting in a local demand in the highlands for captives brought from inland\textsuperscript{14}. The cost of the slave trade to the Umbundu peoples is hard to estimate. Umbundu individuals generally became victims of the trade as a result either of capture in war or sale by relatives for debt, the latter practice being particularly prevalent during hard times such as the rubber slump preceding the 1902 war. Ovimbundu were well represented among domestic slaves in mid-19th century Angolan slave registers as well as among serviços shipped to São Tomé in the later decades of the century\textsuperscript{15}.

Other important exports before the rubber boom included ivory and beeswax. Ivory’s significance as an export seems to have grown after the 1834 abolition of the Portuguese royal monopoly in its trade, although early smuggling had been widespread. Its importance dwindled after the 1880’s, due both to the disappearance of Angola’s elephant herds and to the official closing of the Congo Free State’s borders to this trade. Umbundu caravans continued to ply old routes into the Congo, but they did so to acquire supplies of slaves rather than ivory\textsuperscript{16}. Beeswax was Angola’s most important export from the 1840’s until the rubber boom, in Luanda and Benguela customs lists. The Ovimbundu at first collected it close to home, then increasingly travelled into the interior to find new sources of wax\textsuperscript{17}. It and other exports were supplanted in importance in the 1880’s by rubber.
The Rubber Trade

Beginning in the 1870’s, Umbundu entrepreneurs discovered and developed a new type of root rubber ("red rubber") available in the Nano itself or in immediately neighboring regions. Much more accessible than the "true rubber" of the far interior, in 1891 its export was sixteen times what it had been five years earlier. The history of the rubber trade breaks down into three periods: the rise of the trade (1874-1886); the rubber boom (1886-1900); and the rubber slump and decline of the caravan trade (1900-1911).

Bailundu’s key position as middleman on the Benguela plateau was enhanced by the rubber trade. Before 1890, the neighboring Umbundu kingdom of Bihe to the east had dominated the Nano’s trade into the interior as well as a good portion of the trade between the Nano and the coast. In 1890, however, a Portuguese military force unexpectedly and rapidly overthrew the sova of Bihe and replaced him with a puppet, at the same time increasing the Portuguese military force at a small presídio (Belmonte) located next to Bihe’s capital. Bihe was thus opened up to more intensive settlement by European traders, and even by Boer and Portuguese farmers.

During the next decade, an unprecedented number of Bailundu moved into private trade, leaving behind the traditional war and raiding activities of the pre-1890-era. By 1900, Bailundu was becoming as dominant in the long-distance trade to the interior as Bihe had been. Bailundu caravans, along with those of their lesser neighbors, transported rubber from its point of origin to the coast. Africans were able to dominate rubber gathering, marketing and transport, although moradores in the Nano also endeavored to capture a portion of the trade. The 1890’s saw intense commercial activity and unrivalled prosperity in Bailundu, remembered as late as 1955-56 at a time when the Ovimbundu had more "clothes" than they ever did later. Good times lasted until 1900 and the onset of the rubber slump.

Internal Organization of African Trade

The export of rubber, slaves, and other primary products, as well as the transport inland of European manufactured goods, involved Ovimbundu both as carriers and as traders. As a general pattern, porters in the carrier trade dealt on their own behalf whether they were part of an indigenously-organized or foreign-hired caravan. Often whole caravans were organized – capital raised, personnel collected, leadership provided - by Africans, either by commoner entrepreneurs or by sovas. Although some moradores collected a retinue of outsiders (degredados and other deserters, outsider Africans, and even sometimes local Umbundu villages under their control), almost all Portuguese traders or agents depended at least partially on porters available from local rulers.

As long as the number of outsider traders was not so great as to threaten the authority of the sova, Bailundu could control and manipulate the middle-
man trade to her own advantage, assuring her own key role. The transport of goods on the heads and backs of African porters was the bane of the Portuguese trader for centuries. He deplored his dependence on an institution he could not regulate and which placed him at the mercy of local African authorities. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Portuguese administration and private traders alike tried to introduce a variety of alternative methods of transport: burros, horses, ox carts, and even elephants and camels. But it was only after the political subjugation of the kingdoms and the coming of modern roads and railways that the Portuguese could dominate the context of the Nano's trade.

Although there were at least 22 Umbundu kingdoms, only a handful of these dominated the highlands politically and economically. The smaller kingdoms were olombala (clusters of villages with their own royal prince and clan). These olumbala differed from atumbu (village clusters ruled by commoner sekulu or village patrilineage headmen) only in their possession of royal clans. Olombala and atumbu were the building blocks of the larger "umbrella" kingdoms, whose sovas had won their ascendancy by means of military force, ties of kinship, clever diplomacy, or economic domination. These larger "umbrella" kingdoms included Bailundu in the northwest, Bihe in the northeast, Wambu in the center, and a curve of some half dozen smaller kingdoms farther to the south. Bailundu, Bihe and Wambu were all associated in one way or another in the events of 1902.

Double-descent Kinship and the Sova

Bailundu was able to adapt two important features of her social and political organization to the demands of a long-distance trading state. The first of these was the kinship system. The second was the institution of the sova or king.

The Ovimundu possessed a double-descent kinship system, thus recognizing the descent of an individual through both his patrilineage (oluse) and matrilineage (oluina). Each of these lineages performed distinct roles in the economy and possessed its own headmen and spiritual authority. It was through the patrilineage (oluse) that political authority passed from the village level through the sekulu (chief or headman) to the capital of the kingdom and the sova. Rights over land were inherited through the oluse, as were most political offices at the kingdom's court.

The matrilineage (oluina) cut across village and even kingdom boundaries. All movable property, especially trade capital, passed through the oluina. As the Ovimundu responded to the stimulus of trading opportunity, especially accelerated during the rubber boom, the functions of the oluina gained further importance in their daily lives. It was through the oluina that caravans were organized: capital raised, personnel collected, leadership provided, profits distributed. Maternal uncles commanded the services of sisters' sons, even selling them into slavery if necessary. Each oluina possessed a headman, whose traditional task was to perform the lineage's political
and ritual duties of leadership. As Bailundu caravans reached maximum size during the rubber boom (sometimes numbering more than a thousand men, women and children and travelling away from home for more than one or two years), their entrepreneur sekulus came to assume elaborate political and religious roles, based on those traditionally associated with oluina headmen but on a larger scale. In this way, the oluina provided the political and religious mechanism for a state away from home\textsuperscript{25}.

Such a growth of matrilineage authority and power may have posed a threat to the traditional position of the sova. The last two decades of the 19th century saw newly asserted independence on the part of various subchiefs in Bihe and Bailundu, societies especially immersed in trading activities\textsuperscript{26}. To some extent, the sovas responded by utilizing trade to their own advantage as private individuals. During the 19th century, there came to be royal caravans or macas, consisting of the sova, various councillors, followers, and slaves. Sovas also continued their long-established practices of exacting tribute or even plundering traders’ establishments and other caravans\textsuperscript{27}.

Unlike the kings of some West African trading states, the Umbundu sova never developed a royal monopoly nor managed to interfere significantly in the trade organized by his commoner subjects, other than by plundering as much as might be tolerated, and by serving as a court of high appeal for disputes, many of which involved trade matters. The sova served his subjects by representing the interests of the kingdom in making war, affirming alliances (often reflecting trade factors), tolerating or abusing outside traders resident in the kingdom, negotiating transit privileges with states across which Ovimbundu desired to pass, and sitting with his councillors as a high court to rule upon disputes, some of which involved property inheritance and trade matters. Although he was a divine king and the incarnation of the royal ancestors, the sova’s power was not absolute. Speaking of the macotas (the sova’s advisors or councillors), an observer in the 1870’s wrote: ‘The sobas honor and flatter their macotas: These are the persons who have raised a king to power and who can also knock him down.’\textsuperscript{28} The macotas were instrumental in determining state policy, at times keeping their states out of war or urging more aggressive policies, sitting on the sova’s court and influencing its judgments, and forming the reservoir of leadership from which a new sova would eventually be chosen\textsuperscript{29}.

Bailundu and its Neighbors

Bailundu’s traditional method of diplomacy consisted in skillfully playing off one neighbor against another, utilizing a combination of selective alliances, threats, and raiding and plundering. Also central to her traditional diplomatic strategy was the establishment and maintenance of buffer zones of tributary African states between herself and potentially threatening
neighbors, including the Portuguese at the coast. Warfare and raiding were an important part of traditional Umbundu life. Such wars were not sustained campaigns, but rather isolated attacks on villages, caravans, moradores' establishments, or Portuguese presídios. Larger-scale attacks often involved alliances between several sovas and sub-chiefs. Sovas were expected to call their warriors into war camps located at some distance from the kingdom's capital as an early inauguration of their enthronement, usually resulting in periods of unrest whenever a new sova assumed power. There also were short periods of lawless raiding and stealing of all movable property, Umbundu and outsider, when a sova died.

Warfare between Portuguese and Ovimbundu occurred during the 18th and 19th century along the two major trade routes into the Nano from the coast, along the Northern route through Catumbella or Novo Redondo through Bailundu and sometimes Northern Wambu of Bihe, or along the Southern route linking Benguela with Dombe Grande, Quilengues, Caconda Nova, and the states of the Southern Nano. Along the Southern route, the Portuguese built the presídios of Quilengues and Caconda Nova, resulting in extensive settlement of outsiders (African and European) from the 18th century on. The Southern Umbundu kingdoms (Kiyaka, Chikuma, Kalukembe, Kitata and Galange) were drawn into a struggle to control the Southern routes through their states, a struggle also involving other non-Umbundu peoples in the South. Kwanyama raids up into Kalukembe in the mid-1800's, as well as Chokwe expansion westward during the later part of the 19th century, exacerbated unrest. There were sweeping attacks on presídios and on African peoples in the Southern Nano in 1756, 1795-96, 1811-13, the 1830's, and 1860. Throughout the period there were also repeated smaller molestations and robberies of moradores, and small-scale wars with their private armies.

In contrast with the smaller kingdoms to the South, Bailundu and Bihe attempted to consolidate their positions in a peaceful context during the 19th century. After an early and important war with the Portuguese in 1774-76, during which the sovas of both kingdoms were overthrown, Bailundu managed to stay at peace (albeit an uneasy one) with the Portuguese until the 1870's. Probably because of their larger size and common economic interest in preserving peace along the trade routes of the northern Nano, Bailundu and Bihe did not see warfare as the most important means of diplomacy.

By the end of the 19th century, however, Bailundu’s position had changed drastically. With the subjugation of Bihe by the Portuguese in 1890, an important independent ally and counterfoil was eliminated. Also, by the late part of the century, Bailundu’s effective borders had shrunk extensively from what they had been in the 18th century, reflecting the loss of the allegiance of a number of buffer states between Bailundu and the coast. Finally, the number of outsider traders resident within the kingdom increased dramatically during the last decades of the 1800’s, narrowing the
sova’s realm of action and stimulating greater interest in Bailundu politics on the part of the Portuguese government. By 1890, the network of trade routes in the Nano was being revolutionized by a Portuguese thrust (embodied in the construction of a road for Boer ox wagons) to link the routes and presídiós of the Southern Nano with the prosperous markets and routes through Bailundu and Bihe in the North. By 1900, Bailundu’s earlier traditional and effective means of diplomacy were no longer operative.

Part II: Roots of the Revolt

The Portuguese Presence

By the end of the 19th century, official relations between the Portuguese (represented by a handful of petty officials and a few soldiers) and the Bailundu were not those typical of an imperial power and a subordinated African state. The relationship might better be likened to that of rival sovereign powers in constant conflict, fed by provocations from both parties.

By 1902, Africans resident on the Benguela plateau were aware that the Portuguese position was not well established. Beyond the fifty mile radius of the port city of Benguela, the administrative system imposed by the Portuguese was amorphous, informal, and at times chaotic. The Umbundu kingdoms of Wambu and Bailundu faced an internal political crisis linked to the weakness of Portuguese political control over a host of chiefdoms and states nominally dominated by presídiós. Military occupation in some places - even close to the coast - was nil. This was a fact that encouraged African self-assertion and, eventually, the 1902 rising itself.

In the previous year, a report of the Governor-General emphasized that the administration of the Southern plateau - adjacent to the Benguela area - was in a state of "semi-paralysis". In the extensive area between Bailundu and the coast, there was only one Portuguese fort; to the East, there was a post at Belmonte (Bihe) and one on the Cuanza River. Portuguese higher officials were aware of the weakness; the report of the Governor-General Francisco Cabral de Moncada, dated April 30, 1902, had referred to lack of military occupation, and to the possibility of an African rising. An incident in February 1902 pointed up the anomalous Portuguese position. When the retiring Capitão-mor of Bihe, Lt. Alexandre Malheiro, passed through the areas to the West of Bailundu, through Soque territory, he was threatened and assaulted physically, barely escaping, after an incident involving an argument between his porters and some Soque people over a few bottles of rum. He complained to Luanda.
Portuguese Relations with Bailundu and Wambu

The first direct Portuguese threat to the Ovimbundu of the plateau came in 1890, when a Portuguese punitive expedition defeated forces of the sova of Bihe, Ndunduma, captured him, and deported the leader. The kingdom of Bihe was therefore considered "pacified", and a Portuguese fort was established in Belmonte, alongside the capital of Bihe. The Portuguese however did not move to crush the equally important kingdoms of Bailundu and Wambu at this time.

In 1890 or 1891, the Portuguese seem to have dispatched a small force of African soldiers under Portuguese command to bring Bailundu under their control. According to one African account of the event, these soldiers came to Bailundu "disguised as porters with loads of goods."39 In 1896, the Portuguese moved more definitively, establishing a fort near the sova’s ombala. In that year, the newly-established Bailundu sova, Numa II, attacked the fort, and the Portuguese Capitão-mor retaliating by burning the sova’s village.40 There is also evidence that a Portuguese force that same year (1896) sustained a defeat by Africans near Bimbe, on the banks of the River Keve.41

Internal political stability in Bailundu was disturbed by the Portuguese presence. Between the long, prosperous reign of Ekuikui (1876-1893), and the war of 1902, there were five sovas, not counting the 1902 war leader, Mutu-Ya-Kavela, who is also counted by tradition a sova.42 The following is a list of Bailundu sovas between 1875 and 1911.43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sova</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekuikui</td>
<td>1876-1893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katiavala</td>
<td>1893-1895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numa II</td>
<td>1895-1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hundungulu</td>
<td>(? 1898-99, 1901-1902?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalakata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalandula</td>
<td>(January-May 1902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutu-ya-Kavela</td>
<td>(May-August 1902)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cisende III</td>
<td>1904-1911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The successor of Numa II, who came to power after Numa was either deposed or died in 1896, was Hundungulu (Undungulo in Portuguese accounts).44 He probably assumed power in 1898, but in 1899 or 1900 was deposed and jailed at the Bailundu fort by the Portuguese, charged with arousing his people to "rebellion" and allying for war against the authorities with the sova of Wambu. In mid-1901, he was released and restored to authority by the Portuguese. Although there was evidence of a tacit alliance (but no action) between Wambu and Bailundu in 1901, this was discounted by the Portuguese when they released him. Captain Pedro Massano de Amorim, later to play a key role in the 1902 war and its aftermath, was instrumental in Hundungulu’s release and restoration in 1901.45 For reasons unknown, Hundungulu was apparently poisoned in early 1902 and was succeed-
ed as sova by Kalandula. Portuguese reports suggest that the new sova was strongly influenced by his councillors (macotas) and by diviners (feiticeiro is the Portuguese term, denoting the archaic English words "fetish-maker" or "witch-doctor"). Although the Portuguese had intervened in Bailundu politics, they had not actually conquered the people nor demonstrated a show of overwhelming force.

Nor were adjacent Umbundu states, with the qualified exception of Bihe, under any kind of firm Portuguese control. Even in Bihe, Portuguese military garrisoning was weak and had in fact slipped during the past decade of occupation. From a garrison of 135 soldiers in 1892, its forces had diminished to only 47 (three Portuguese officers, two sergeants and 42 African soldiers) in 1901.

The neighboring Umbundu kingdom of Wambu was a case of an independent pocket, an African polity which had not come under firm Portuguese control as late as 1902. The Portuguese had not fulfilled their threat to pacify this state during their 1890 campaign in Bihe. Wambu remained vigorously independent, and this example of defiance combined with the recent rumor of an unfulfilled alliance with Bailundu to feed the African desire for self-assertion. Wambu’s independent position helped to create a political atmosphere favourable to the 1902 rising. As a local American missionary reported home after the 1902 war: "...the result of it all (Wambu’s defiance) had been to make the natives far & wide believe that the government lacked power." 49

Christianity and the Missionary Factor

Canadian and American Protestant missionaries were the first to establish themselves in the Bailundu area. In 1881, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions set up several stations near the olombala of Sova Ekuikui of Bailundu. In 1884, the mission was expelled by Ekuikui and its station burned by his order, apparently at the instigation of a local Portuguese trader. Later, however, Ekuikui had a change of heart and invited the missionaries to return. Thereafter, Christianity gained influence in the area.

The mission was influential especially due to its schools. Primary schools represented the key of the spread of Christian influence among Africans, and there was a noted increase in demand for education after the rubber depression. During the 1890’s, other missions established themselves in the area, including in 1896 the Holy Ghost Mission under Padre Ernesto Lecomte. The ABCFM Mission underwent, in the words of one historian, "a virtual explosion of outstation activities, especially schools" after 1896. School attendance was increasing rapidly by 1900–1902, after a slow start. In 1901 at their Bailundu and Bihe schools, the ABCFM claimed to have at least 1,146 African students. By 1903 the figure had jumped to 2,204. A similar trend was noted in the less numerous Catholic mis-
sion schools nearby, along with the fact that youth more than the older generations tended to be attracted to Christianity.\(^53\)

Beyond schools, the growth of the missionary establishment itself suggests an increased influence among the Bailundu. By 1902, the establishment had expanded from a solitary station at Bailundu to four stations (including Kamundongo, Chisamba, and Sakanjamba), and fourteen outstations. Associated with the sixteen white missionaries was a fledgling African "Christian group", which by official ABCFM figures included a total of 61 African "helpers", of which 32 were termed "unordained preachers." Sunday school membership was put at 1045, and one source estimated that the schools in 1902 had 2,129 Umbundu pupils. At Kamundongo (Bihe), on the eve of the war, Sunday services were attracting between 500 and 600 Africans in April 1902.\(^54\) In 1902, the African contribution to ABCFM missions was $79.00; although small, this was a significant sign that a new class of Angolan was in the making.\(^55\) Looking at figures for 1908, the growth of the Protestant missions seems to have been steady throughout even the chaotic war period of 1902-1904.\(^56\)

Some elements of Umbundu leadership were being influenced enough by the missionaries to "convert." In 1901, one sova (actually a sub-chief) named Kanjundu was reported to have told the annual missionary meeting of his conversion. Later this leader informed the missionaries of his inland trade expedition to the lands of Chief Lewanika, of the hymn singing of his companions, and of how the caravan flag, of new design, featured a cross.\(^57\) At least one other chief of Bihe, the son of the former sova Ciyuka, was converted to Christianity during 1900-1901.\(^58\)

Although members of the royal lineages were perhaps less influenced by Christian teachings than the mass of commoners, by 1902 the Bailundu aristocracy was well aware of the activities of missionaries.

Missionaries, Christianity, and the 1902 Rising

The role of the Christian missions in the 1902 war is difficult to assess. The impact of their influence and of Christian teachings in general was greater than any actual part played by missionaries or their converts.

The Protestant ABCFM mission represented much more of a radical influence in Umbundu society than the Catholics, due both to its greater scope in the area and to the fact that it was organized and manned by foreigners.

The ABCFM mission was viewed with distrust by both the Portuguese authorities and outsider (specially European) traders. The government was suspicious of its non-Portuguese base. Its threat was underlined by the fact that the American and Canadian missionaries conducted their schools in a combination of Umbundu and English languages until the 20th century.\(^59\) The mission assumed an even more threatening caste in the last decade of the 1800's, at a time when the extent of Portuguese colonial possessions
in Africa was being questioned in European diplomatic circles. Throughout the 1880's and 1890's, English missionaries (whose motives were questioned by the colonial administration in Angola) were utilizing the ABCFM stations and trade facilities at the coast as way stations and sources of supply for their own establishments in the Congo (Garenganze) and the headwaters of the Zambezi. These English missionaries also involved themselves actively in matters at the Bihe and Bailundu capitals. Also, the constant opposition to slavery and the slave trade expressed by the ABCFM personnel was a thorn in the side of the Portuguese administration.

Traders were no less suspicious of the American mission and its motives. The missionaries consistently opposed the sale of rum and the conduct of the trade in serviços. Also, to the traders the mission and its Christian community represented a rival economic interest to their own. Although mission teachings claimed to cause Christian converts to question the validity of accumulated wealth, they also promoted literacy and accounting skills, and stimulated self-discipline. Christian villagers came to organize trading ventures around a Christian core, utilizing such expeditions for a combination of personal profit and proselytization. The ABCFM missionary W.F. Currie, who developed a trading capital and organization as a basis for funding his program of industrial education, was viewed with jealousy as one of Bailundu's more powerful traders by men associated with other commercial agencies in Catumbella and Benguela. Animosity between the traders and the mission exploded at various times, and was responsible, for example, for the expulsion of the ABCFM missionaries from Bailundu in 1886.

The missionaries and their converts played little if any active part in the 1902 rising, however. Although the Bailundu war leaders trusted several of the missionaries, at times using them as channels of communication with the Portuguese fort, the missionaries themselves had mixed feelings about African motives and were reluctant to depart from a position of strict non-involvement; a number of them were strongly in favor of the Portuguese side. When the fort was besieged by Bailundu forces, Christian villagers provided the cut-off victims in the fort with food; the American missionaries were also called upon for medical services. Christian chiefs seem to have waited for the outcome of early events, rather than joining the war leaders. The position of the mission was a delicate one. The foreign missionaries depended ultimately on the good will of the Portuguese authorities for the successful continuation of their endeavor. Although they were a potential focus for reform, and were perceived by Africans as a valued ally in appealing to Luanda for redress of grievances, the missionaries were anxious not to compromise their position in the country. Although a couple of missionaries openly expressed sympathy with the African cause, they were careful to limit their sympathy to just words. Accusations of a larger role in the events of 1902 came later, when the mission continued to be
a stumbling block to Portuguese ambitions in Bailundu during the early decades of the 1900's.\footnote{71}

Christian ideas did play a significant part in the development of African demands for reform. The crucial issues were domestic slavery and the slave trade, and to a lesser extent the manufacture and sale of rum (águardente) by local traders. Protestant mission teachings focused a steady stream of criticism on the local forms of slavery. The mission stations served as magnets for runaway slaves. Some chiefs, after experiencing considerable mission pressure against slavery, freed their slaves. A substantial number of the mission's earliest young converts had been slaves.\footnote{71} Mission teachings began to threaten the interests of moradores when they extended themselves to an attack on rum and the serviços trade as well.

The Trade in Serviças and Rum

Various activities of local traders in Bailundu angered and demoralized the Bailundu. Traders sold and encouraged the local manufacture of rum. They possessed a generally unsavoury reputation in their trading and after 1899 began to increase their involvement in the serviços trade. The serviços trade was a euphemistic term for a system of slave labor exported to the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. As a consequence of the slump in rubber prices at the turn of the century, there was widespread unemployment and inactivity among Ovimbundu. At the same time, there was a rise in the price of labor in the cocoa islands, further stimulating a growth in the export of Angolan labor.\footnote{73}

The influence of the serviços trade on the Bailundu and their neighbors was far-reaching. The increase in the number of traders, their general activities, and their rum selling and slave dealing in general represented major evils resented by African inhabitants of the plateau. The annual average of serviços recruited for São Tomé in the several years preceding 1902 was about 3,000. During the first quarter of 1902, however, there was a significant increase, perhaps reaching 4,000 or more.\footnote{74}

Whatever the exact numbers of Ovimbundu being forcibly removed from the country, it is clear that this trade was a major African grievance, in the words of one Protestant missionary, "a form of enslaving the people".\footnote{75} It was not however the major nor the only grievance of Africans caught up in the 1902 rising. Later accounts of Angola at the turn of the century, and especially the subsequent writings of Englishmen and Americans concerned with publicizing and thus ending the exploitation of forced labor, tended to blow up the significance of the serviços trade out of proportion.\footnote{76} The trade was only a part of the larger picture of African grievances against the generally arbitrary action and
lawlessness of the outside traders. It is more likely that the Africans viewed the traders’ activity and presence as a totality. In fact, at least some Ovimbundu played a major role in the conduct of the serviços system during 1902, several of the leaders of the 1902 rising raided for slaves during the war, and Umbundu caravans intensified slave-trading among their neighbors (and even among themselves) after the collapse of the rubber boom. In 1902, the economics of the slave trade appeared to be irresistible to numbers of Africans and Portuguese alike in central Angola. An African trader travelling to the Luba area on the Congo border could get as many as “15 slaves for a very good rifle”, and one “good slave would buy from 70 to 100 milreis (§ 56 to § 80) at the coast.”

The Ovimbundu paid a high price for their role in this trade. A Canadian missionary reported in 1902 at the end of the rising: “I venture to say that more ovimbundu (sic) have been seized or killed while seeking slaves in the interior during the past two years, than have yet been killed or made prisoner in this rebellion.”

Another paramount grievance was the demoralization brought about by consumption of rum. Excessive drinking of rum by many levels of African society was evident by 1902, even in the reports of the Capitain-major of Bihe during 1901-02. Certain African leaders acquired a hatred of the rum trade and blamed the Portuguese traders and their allies for it. During the 1902 rising, the major leader of the African forces, Mutu-ya-Kavela, manifested his opposition to aguardente in an impassioned speech before the war council in June 1902. Wesley Stover, the American missionary who witnessed it, called it “one of the most telling speeches I have ever heard.” Mutu-ya-Kavela deplored rum and the physical effects of its consumption; “Before the traders came we had our own home beer, we lived long lives and were strong.”

Economic Depression: The Rubber Slump

The crisis in Bailundo at the end of the 19th century was further exacerbated by bewilderment and anger at the sudden drop in rubber prices during 1899-1902. In 1898, rubber prices were artificially high, perhaps as much as triple the actual value of the commodity. The reasons for the drop included the practice by European trade houses and agents of granting excessive trade credit, as well as changing conditions on the world, market and in Angola, and a deterioration in the quality of the rubber brought down to the coast. Prosperity based on earlier high prices had encouraged a growth in credit available to Africans, higher wages, and the capacity to purchase some Western goods such as clothes, bicycles and other manufactures. Africans who became permutadores (lit. barterers, exchangers) received good rewards for their roles in running stores and heading trade expeditions. A small class of Umbundu “proto-
capitalists" had emerged in the rubber trade. A severe economic depression set in upon the collapse of rubber prices in 1899-1900. Many Africans failed to comprehend the technical reasons for the slump, saw only their hardships, and naturally blamed the disaster on the Portuguese in general, and the moradores or traders in particular. The problem was intensified after 1899 in Bailundu and even earlier in Bihe by the intrusion of European traders who set up establishments on the plateau and moved inland, bag and baggage, from the coast in search of new opportunity. When rubber prices plummeted, both Portuguese merchants and a wave of new poor whites (composed of degredados and South African Boer farmers as well as petty traders) arrived to establish themselves in commerce. By early 1902, traders had established some 500 casas (lit. houses) in the Bailundu area alone.

Disease and famine also pressed the Ovimbundu in 1901-02. A serious smallpox epidemic ravaged Bailundu villages just before the outbreak of the 1902 rising and caused high mortality, a mission vaccination campaign being only partly successful in checking the disaster. At the same time, further to the South there was drought and cattle disease, resulting in famine in the area near Huíla. Africans probably responded in much the same way as the Swiss missionary Heli Chatelain, who wrote in 1902, "The devil is raging around us in many different ways." Part III: An Account of the 1902 Rising

The Outbreak

The immediate cause of the rising was a local dispute which began in Bailundu in April 1902. A standard Portuguese source claims that the war began when the Bailundu became "motivated by the detention of an indebted chief over some bottles of rum." During the celebration of Kalandula's accession to the sovaship in 1902, rum was "bought" or bartered from a local Portuguese trader. The trader later accused one of Kalandula's macotas, the leader Mutu-ya-Kavela, of not having paid for the rum. Whatever the truth of this allegation, the dispute sparked a quarrel between the Bailundu leaders and the Capitão-mor at the fort. The latter official asked that the concerned African leaders appear at the fort. Mutu-ya-Kavela refused and asserted that he no longer recognized the authority of the Capitão-mor. This occurred on or about April 7, 1902.

Two days later, on April 9, there was a great assembly at the olombala of Bailundu, bringing together representatives from neighboring Umbundu states, including Wambu. Although little is known today of what transpired in the assembly, the Bailundu prepared for war. The Portuguese
Capitão-mor made an abortive attempt to frighten the leaders by a show of force and some arbitrary acts, but he accomplished nothing beyond further alienation. On May 15, for reasons unknown, sova Kalandula and at least four sekulus (elders or sub-chiefs) went to the Bailundu fort to parley, but were immediately seized and imprisoned by the Portuguese official. This was the final casus belli, sparking the rising of the Bailundu, who in turn encouraged other Umbundu peoples to join them. Though the Portuguese claimed the war had ended with the capture of Kalendula, the rising of 1902 was only beginning.

The early momentum of the rising was made possible by a general feeling on the part of the African leaders and their followers, and not a few Europeans as well, that the striking power of Portugal was weak, that evidence of sovereignty was wretched, and that the African politics if they combined might prevail. Only a year and a half before the war, an American missionary reported that "Throughout the country the blacks expect that the Portuguese will withdraw sooner or later, & the dominion revert to the chiefs." If there was an African expectation of eventual political "dominion", the rumor in early 1902 that another Portuguese presídio was to be built in or near Bailundu must have upset Bailundu leaders.

The spark that began the war - the arrest of a sova - was not an uncommon occurrence in recent Bailundu history. What was extraordinary was that several Umbundu kingdoms, and states other than the one directly confronted with the crisis, were ready and willing to declare a general war and drive out traders and Portuguese officials. In view of this African attitude, in the beginning one of ascendant superiority to the Portuguese, it is a mistake to term the 1902 war a mere "rebellion."

Portuguese Actions

In response to early events in Bailundu, the Portuguese authorities raised three columns of Portuguese, African, and auxiliary Boer troops. They were to relieve the besieged Bailundu presídio and then "pacify" the country. The earliest to reach Bailundu was the so-called "Northern Column", which had left a post near the Cuanza River on June 17 and reached the Bailundu fort on July 10. Commanded by Lieutenant Pais Brandão, this column consisted of fewer than 100 troops. The next column to set out was the "Caconda Column", commanded by the Governor of Benguela, Joaquim Teixeira Moutinho, later accused of incompetence by the Governor-General. The column left Benguela on August 1 and, after long delays at Caconda, reached the Bailundu presídio on September 23, with a force of about 215 men, including Boers commanded by a certain W. Grobler. The final column, the largest, was staged at Luanda, left Benguela on August 9, and reached
Bailundu Fort by September 24. Commanded by Captain Pedro Massano de Amorim, this was perhaps the largest Portuguese expedition of its type raised in half a century. It consisted of a total of 458 soldiers, of which some 142 were metropolitan Portuguese troops sent from Lisbon, some 261 African auxiliary troops organized into two "native companies", and a few provincial European soldiers; over a thousand African porters recruited to carry the column's supplies. The largest column was charged with the more ambitious mission, upon whose success the Angolan Governor-General had based a recovery plan for the colony. Armed with modern rifles and an artillery battery of four mountain guns (a weapon proving decisive during the rising), this column was to pacify decisively as much of the Benguela plateau as possible; to establish and garrison new military posts at key points; to discover the cause of "the explosion of revolt"; to normalize interrupted commerce; and to "vassalize" as many African chiefs as possible, imprisoning all "agitators".

The Course of the Campaign

The campaign was composed of a series of skirmishes and battles between the African forces and elements of the three Portuguese columns. Between May and early July of 1902, from the time the Bailundu leaders determined to go to war until the event of the first battle, no significant Portuguese armed force was to be found in the Bailundu-Bihe area. The fort was besieged and the capitão-mor dared not leave it; many traders and their families had fled to the presídio in fear for their lives; various Portuguese trading posts and houses had been burned, sacked, and some traders killed or captured; serviços in some areas had rebelled. During this period, the African forces attempted to seal off the Bailundu section of the plateau by blocking the few roads to the coast and the South with obstacles or regular patrols.

The appearance of the Portuguese-led expeditions tipped the balance in favor of the colonial administration. The fighting between organized armies lasted roughly three months, the Portuguese enjoying a number of advantages. First, although there were few roads into the war area, with transport difficult even with Boer oxcarts, the Portuguese enjoyed the mobility which came with dry season conditions. The dry season (lasting generally from May I to September 15) allowed the intruding forces more mobility, while it deprived Africans of badly needed ground cover. Furthermore, in the dry season the climate was milder and the likelihood of disease among unseasoned Portuguese troops was diminished. Second, and most decisive, the Portuguese enjoyed far superior fire-power. Although they were usually heavily outnumbered, most of their soldiers had new repeating rifles, while the Africans who were armed at all generally possessed only decrepit lazarinas (old muzzle-loading trade rifles). There was some direct evidence that a few Africans had newer rifles, obtained either by purchase from local Portuguese traders or by theft during the war.
The ultimate martial advantage of the Portuguese was the artillery they had brought with them from the coast. Mobile artillery was used to break up African attacks and then to blast the survivors out of their rocky hill or mountain retreats (often olombalas or fortified villages). Under the circumstances, there was no possible African response to artillery fire other than flight. Over the entire period of the rising, the Portuguese must have inflicted at least several thousand casualties among the Africans, while taking few losses themselves.

However, the story of the rising was not yet another dreary recapitulation of bloody colonial campaigns. It had a significance beyond the military events themselves; there were cross-state alliances among the Ovimbundu and their neighbors in the war; African resistance, well-organized and led, lasted well beyond the three month campaign; and African doggedness was underlined by the almost suicidal "last stands" by Africans on remote mountain tops and ledges. Resistance was surprisingly tough and sustained, and even though the Portuguese claimed a "total victory", surviving elements of the African forces struggled in remote areas for nearly two years after the inception of the war.

Cabral de Moncada, then Governor-General of Angola, illustrated the surprised reaction of the Portuguese authorities to the uniqueness of the African response. In his classic account of the war, he referred to the rising as the "Bailundu revolution" and praised the bravery of several African leaders who perished in the fighting. The Angolan struggle reminded this Portuguese official of historical conflicts in the Iberian peninsula, of frequent pronunciamientos, quixotic generals, and barracks revolts. He described the sova Mutu-ya-Kavela as terrible but "great with courage (bravura)" and as "this brave caudillo (military chief) of black war," initiating a movement against heavy odds and uncertain of which groups would join or fail him in their support. In the history of Lusophone Africa, then, the 1902 Bailundu rising was something more than a classic campaign, the first of the modern "pacification" attempts in modern Angola. It was also proof of the African resistance factor and its endurance.

The African Strategy

The general goal of the Africans who declared war in 1902 was the obliteration of all vestiges of Portuguese control from Umbundu territory. More specifically, they intended to drive out the Portuguese and mestizo traders and government officials and to punish certain hated individuals. During the course of the war, African objectives swelled to even greater proportions; one missionary account reported that the African leaders intended not only the destruction of the fort at Bailundu, but also the elimination of the settlement at Cacundo, the capture of Benguela, and the expulsion of Europeans from the country.
A major target of African animosity was the trader community. In many ways, the war was first and foremost a clash between traders and the local inhabitants. The rebels may have killed some two dozen traders during the war; one reliable account estimated the loss of "20 Europeans and 100 civilized blacks", a report probably closer to the truth than the exaggerated news appearing in the Portuguese press during June and July of 1902. However, the war leaders at times tempered violence with mercy, as when they let it be known through the American mission that traders who left the country voluntarily would be allowed free passage. Some traders even tried to masquerade as Christian "teachers" in an attempt to escape African anger.

In terms of African goals, the war was not an exclusively anti-European or anti-white conflict. Although there were cries of "down with the whites!" in the June war camps, Africans ultimately killed more mestizos and so-called "civilized blacks" (an early proto-type of the assimilado) than whites during the course of the war. A number of mestizo traders and agents were slaughtered, the houses sacked and burned. Africans effectively settled old scores against westernized blacks. The most celebrated single killing committed by the African forces involved a particularly hated trader, a mestizo named Antônio de Silveira (nicknamed "Camberises"), who was captured and perhaps tortured by his enemies before being executed; his body was then roasted and consumed in a ceremony most likely intended to produce "success magic" for the war. It may have been Silveira’s wife who was forced by her African captors to carry her husband’s head in a basket, possibly a manifestation of the traditional ritual of the Kandundu cult.

African vengeance, then, was selective. A number of prisoners were taken in early June 1902, paraded in irons and chains during the visit of an American missionary to the war camp, and reminded of their deeds by being stripped, chained by the neck, and forced to work for their captors. The purpose, noted the missionary, was "to see how it feels." In order to avoid capture by the African forces, some traders were reported to have committed suicide. However, the selectivity of African violence was most evident in the fact that Catholic and Protestant mission personnel were not harmed by the war party. American missionaries were allowed to travel unmolested through the war area and the African war leaders even entrusted the American missionary Stover and the Holy Ghost Father Goipp with the role of mediator during an exchange of prisoners with the front in June. Mutu-ya-Kavela trusted the Protestant mission sufficiently to ask them for ammunition in exchange for a load of rubber, eventually receiving a shirt and some salt rather than the requested cartridges.

Besides African vengeance against traders and officials, Umbundu leaders may have intended a general attack on the rum trade. The making and selling of rum on the plateau was disturbingly prevalent, rum stills being found in many villages and the spirits being sold often as a part of the usual payment for loads of rubber and slaves. Africans from all levels of society consumed aguardente, from chiefs to common villagers. Hostility toward the rum dealers was shown in both the early speeches of Mutu-ya-Kavela and
the destruction of stills by African forces during the war. When Africans destroyed a rum still in a raid, they often used the salvaged rivets, perhaps symbolically, as bullets against the Portuguese\textsuperscript{106}.

Bailundu Leadership

The major leader of the 1902 rising was Mutu-ya-Kavela (variously spelled Matu-a-Quebera and Matu-ya-Kavela). He was a macota and leading councilor of the sova Kalandula until the latter's capture by the Portuguese, when he was acknowledged as war leader and Bailundu sova in the African assemblies of June 1902. He may have been a partisan of the deceased sova Hundungulu and seems to have been imprisoned at the Portuguese fort during the latter sova's reign. He may also have traced his descent through the royal lineage, being thus of royal blood and eligible traditionally to assume the office of sova; or his ascension may have been due to extraordinary measures taken during a time of great unrest. In any case, his exploits were widely lauded after his death in battle, even by his contemporary, the then Governor-General of Angola. He certainly possessed great charisma and prestige, a potent force behind the rising. Noted for his considerable talents in military organization, he was especially responsible for carrying resistance to other parts of the Umbundu country.

The name Mutu-ya-Kavela was curiously translated by American missionaries into the English epithet "Hard Squash". As was true with other divine rulers in traditional societies, his position as sova was enhanced by religious prestige and sacred powers, in addition to the secular attribute of his office. He was also reported to have a club foot, perhaps a sign of extraordinary spiritual gifts. His record of firm opposition to the Portuguese was established by the time he assumed office as sova; he had been imprisoned in the Bailundu fort during the term of a previous capitão-mor. Certainly he was able to direct well organized resistance, using slender resources to recruit the largest African army seen in the Nano for decades. In Umbundu oral tradition, he was counted as a legitimate sova of Bailundu, and the 1902 was named after him in local African accounts\textsuperscript{108}.

Mutu-ya-Kavela based his appeal for war on an appeal for reform, justice, and freedom from the oppression of the slave trade, rum, and economic depression (seemingly brought on by the machinations of outsider interests and traders). In this appeal, he was echoing the concerns of the Protestant mission, reiterated since the 1880's. He also based his appeal on a glorification of the past, especially the reign of sova Ekuikui II, seen as a golden age of prosperity and traditional values. Mutu-ya-Kavela was thus both a traditionalist and a modernizer, as emerged in his speech of June 8, heard and recorded by an American missionary. After the sova had called together people from several outlying areas, he appealed to the Europeans to send them more "teachers." His stirring speech was partially paraphrased later in a missionary letter home: "We want the words of God and the peace they bring. We are tired of oppression and wrong, we are tired of slavery and
rum." The leader then recounted past history and praised the reign of Ekukui as an era when the Bailundu enjoyed more traditional freedom and happiness.109

African Religion and the Kandundu Cult

One of the forces behind the leadership and organization of the rising was the Kandundu cult, a complex of beliefs possibly versatile and widely believed enough among the Ovimbundu to enlist cross-tribal allegiance in a crisis. In his 1905 travels in the area of the rising, the British anti-slave trade writer Nevinson noted that "Kandundu" was associated with royal ombalas, not ordinary commoner villages, and involved a ceremony including a cage or basket at the top of a pole, a frog symbol of embodiment, and "witch-doctors" who acted as divining oracles of interpretation. Further, Kandunda or Congombo was versatile, as it was not "merely a terror to be averted" but "benevolent" as well. The cult, then, was widely known in 1902 and persisted well into the 20th century. Each royal sova had his own diviner, apparently also of royal blood. He also consulted a "diviner of the basket" or cult leader, an itinerant specialist who went about in the country with a basket and its contents of various objects used for prophesy.110

The Kandundu cult evidently played a part in the organization of the rising. Various key leaders were diviners or cult leaders who went into combat. As a sacred rallying point among most Ovimbundu, the cult may well have solved what T. O. Ranger has termed "the problem of scale", encompassing much of Umbundu society. The cult also seems to have been versatile enough to attract more than a few because of fear.111 Among major leaders identified among the fighting forces were a sova of Kansongi (Soque), a certain "Quissongo" or "Emissongo" who was identified by the Portuguese as a feiticeiro or diviner, and who was killed by the Portuguese at Caiope villages on August 29, when he was reportedly directing the African forces. Another leader was Tchina, a sekulu of the kingdom of Kiyaka (Quiaca), who was referred to by the Portuguese as the "occult power" of that state.112

There is a possibility that among the religious acts performed by those involved in the rising of 1902 was the ritual killing of animals. In 1912, the Portuguese Bishop of Angola and Congo, João Evangelista de Lima Vidal, cited a tradition that the Bailundu killed large numbers of cattle, chickens, pigs and goats near the ombala simply to prevent the animals' cries from giving away to the Portuguese the place of refuge of Africans among the Cambundo rocks. However, there may have been a ritualistic element in the killing of at least some of these animals.113
The Scope of the Rising

While the nuclear forces of the 1902 rising were Bailundu, led by Mutu-ya-Kavela until his death, sovas and their followers from the following independent Umbundu kingdoms joined to fight the Portuguese: Bihe (or Viye), Wambu, Civula, and peoples from peoples who were tributary to Bailundu: the Kasongi, Civanda, and Ngalanga. Further, non-Umbundu peoples to some extent joined the war: these included, to the west of Bailundu, the Kisanji and the Luimbí (Mbuí)\textsuperscript{114}.

Mutu-ya-Kavela inspired other groups to join his rising, both through the calling of assemblies in June and through travelling into different areas. At one point this leader, with a few followers, fled south to Wambu where he joined forces with a Wambu sova, Samakaka, who had previously promised to help Bailundu drive out the Portuguese. The army raised by July, when there was a siege of Bailundu Fort, was estimated to have numbered from 3 to 6,000 men\textsuperscript{115}.

Geographically, the area where the most intense resistance came was bounded by the Balombo River on the west and the Keve on the east, but fighting occurred beyond these boundaries. Leaders went to war from a total of nine African kingdoms, though in the case of Bihe, apparently only one or two sovas or sub-chiefs rose. Although most of those fighting were people living in traditional ways, slaves and servíces\textsuperscript{1} of settlers rebelled and burned the property of their masters\textsuperscript{116}.

There is some controversy in the sources as to which African peoples rose. Nevinson stated flatly that the people of Bihe nearly all refused to fight in 1902, because they were by then, he claimed, "tainted with the softness of trade" and were no longer warriors\textsuperscript{117}. Cabral de Moncada's analysis is more convincing: that only one or two sovas did rise, such as Tchibaba, who was later imprisoned\textsuperscript{118}. Only a little fighting in fact took place in Bihe, as most of the people were waiting to see if the Bailundu-led war would succeed. Mutu-ya-Kavela was not able to cross the Kutato River into Bihe country, although he may have been planning to: he was killed near Tchipindo (Bailundu) on August 4. The attitude of the Bihe people was one of caution, perhaps influenced by the Protestant mission, and as the Governor termed it, "malevolent expectation". Little action was taken\textsuperscript{119}.

In the case of Wambu, although the major sova, Livonge (or Libonge) hesitated to attack the Portuguese, a number of lesser sovas and chiefs joined the war. In the period directly preceding the 1902 war, Wambu's internal affairs were complicated by a number of rivals for power, especially Samakaka, a sova who may have entered Wambu from elsewhere in the Nano some years before. Livonge, Wambu's 25th sova (1895-1902), had not defied the Portuguese authorities, but battles did take place in Wambu in the area of the Naganda and Kandumbu rocks. Samakaka, whose base was at one time in Wambu, had earlier defied the authorities and had inspired an extensive feeling in that area of the plateau that the Ovimbundu
might assert their independence. When the Caonda column came through Wambu, they made a show of force, burned villages, and fought a few battles. They were unable to locate and capture Samakaka, who escaped to Bimbe and then Elende, where he was probably captured by the Portuguese in 1903. Livongue was either killed on August 19, 1902 when the Portuguese attacked his ombala, or may have lived on in hiding until much later.

Samakaka had a mixed reputation as a leader, at least in retrospect. He has been described as a "robber baron", who practiced unusual acts of cruelty. However, in some oral traditions collected in 1955-56 in the area of Bimbe (Gumba), where he fled after leaving Wambu, Samakaka was "spoken of favorably," while Mutu-ya-Kavela was known as a raider for slaves in the area. Whatever his reputation in Bimbe, an area which played a role in the war's aftermath, Samakaka had given refuge to Bailundu in 1902, that inspired resistance, and was said to have prevented the settlement of traders in his area.

African Military Techniques

The Portuguese underestimated not only African bravery and tenacity, but they failed to anticipate the African knowledge of fortification, both offensive and defensive. During the African siege of the Bailundu Fort, broken effectively by the arrival of the Northern Column on July 13-14, the Bailundu constructed ranks of wooden palisades of significant size around the Fort. When fighting defensively, which became the rule after early August, Africans built strong palisades on hillsides to protect their villages. They made full use of the terrain by hiding, firing from, and retreating into the great rock outcroppings where they had their ombalas and villages. Most of the difficult combat took place in the rocks, among massive boulders.

The Bailundu and their neighbors also attempted ambushes of the columns sent against them. At the battle of the River Congo (September 6, 1902), African forces hidden in a wood tried to surround Massano de Amorim's column, but were cut down by massive fire-power and were forced to retreat. Portuguese fire-power devastated African morale, and by September most of the African forces were on the run or were about to surrender. Sovas began to come to parley with the commander of the column and to bring gifts of manioc flour, pigs, chickens, and goats. Massano de Amorim promised protection to loyalists and death to "rebels."

The End of Resistance

Whatever large-scale cooperative movement existed, by August it began to disintegrate as Pais Brandão caught Mutu-ya-Kavela with a small force of comrades and killed him. As other sovas fell, and as remnants of an army retreated or broke up, the rising was stymied. Although perhaps as
many as 6 to 10 thousand Africans fought in combat, and thousands more were caught up in Portuguese attacks on villages along the routes of the three columns, most of the population attempted to escape or gave up. Only a minority continued to resist.

The final martial act in the campaign took place in 1904 in Bimbe, in the Northwest corner of the Umbundu kingdoms, where numbers of fighters had escaped the Portuguese columns and had sought refuge in remote areas. By early 1904, the Portuguese had located a final refuge for gentio rebelde who had fought in the 1902 rising and had fled into the hills of Bimbe. How many there were is unclear, but on March 22, 1904 a Portuguese column of some 230 men under the capitão-mor of Bailundu set out against them. This capitão-mor, Captain Romeiras de Macedo, may well have been an assimilado and mestizo and had replaced the Bailundu capitão-mor who had been indicted and dismissed after the 1902 war. Macedo defeated the African force, captured and destroyed the omula and imprisoned the survivors. Earlier this Bimbe refuge had been reported to be a place where regular trade - in which Europeans took part - was impossible, due to raids, attacks, and destruction of crops wrought by the Africans.125

It required, then, two years to stamp out overt resistance among the Umbundu states rising in 1902. Although the end of regular military operations came in October 1902, when the three Portuguese columns disbanded and returned to the coast, the authorities used garrisons to ferret out war leaders (both real and imagined) who were still at large. Acts of reprisal were carried out, such as the execution of one sova, Civava of Cisende, who was shot and beheaded by the authorities on November 4, 1902.126

Further open resistance was discouraged for a time by the death or capture of most of the African leaders of the rising during and after the decisive intervention of the Portuguese expeditions. Adjacent areas remained hostile to Portuguese settlement and trade, however. In Selles, to the northwest of Bailundu, unrest continued through 1903. The cost of the rising was high: at least 2,000 African lives and perhaps more.127

Part IV: Conclusions

The war was one factor which sealed the fate of traditional ways among the plateau states. One of the its consequences was a more thorough pacification and stronger Portuguese control. Kingdoms like Wambu, not conquered before 1902, now underwent official Portuguese conquest, intervention in their politics (particularly nomination of the sova), and general colonial subordination.132 The war further eroded the economic position of the Ovimbundu and added to the economic crisis in Angola, although the trade situation began to recover in November and December of 1902. The newly pacified status of the northern Nano encouraged a new immigration of European traders and farmers, and trading establishments multiplied.129
The War and Later African Resistance

The memories and traditions of the 1902 rising probably encouraged further resistance in later decades. Viewed in the long perspective of history, there had been Umbundu resistance to Portuguese intrusion for over a century before 1902, and there would be resistance in varying forms later. There was unrest on the Angolan plateau during the military campaigns of 1914-1917, and the bloody Amboim and Selles revolt of 1917-18 must have caused stirrings in Bailundu. In 1920, a serious revolt broke out in Bihe and Bailundu which was prompted by grievances over labor recruitment, forced labor, and land purchases by Europeans. The 1920 revolt was crushed. There were stories of incidents in Bailundu in the late 1930's and 1940's as well.\textsuperscript{135}

The evidence for links between the 1902 rising and later Angolan resistance and nationalism is tantalizing. With little documentation, it has been suggested that in 1957 a "rumor" infiltrated Bailundu that hidden guns were found by the Portuguese police in a village of the Bimbe, that "Angolans recalled the resistance of the Bimbe in the revolt of 1902", and that people were encouraged to believe that the Bimbe would "rise again", since they were "the last ones to surrender" some fifty years before. No source was provided for this tradition, if that is the correct description, and it is difficult to assess its meaning in the current context.\textsuperscript{136} Actually, as has been discussed above, the "Bimbe" who continued to defy the Portuguese until 1904 were not primarily an ethnic group originating in that area, but were in fact migrants, among them Bailundu, who took refuge from the Portuguese columns in the remote Bimbe hills. Regardless of the 1957 rumor, however, there is no doubt that people in the Bailundu area made a series of abortive attempts to organize resistance before the 1961 war.\textsuperscript{137}

Postscript

It has recently been pointed out that there are more than 6,000 "American autobiographical or semi-autobiographical slave narratives" for American history.\textsuperscript{138} What a pity that we have no comparable collection of oral narratives for Angolan history. We need to know far more about the contemporary African view of the 1902 war. For despite the considerable amount of written material now available, the types of available sources have molded our analysis. The Protestant missionary materials, for example, in some respects reveal more about missionary attitudes than about African views.

In the past, the emphasis placed on contract labor (the \textit{serviça}e trade) as the key grievance leading to war was misplaced. It is probable that the Bailundu would have risen without the contract labor grievance, since they already had a sufficient fund of complaints against injustice. If the African control of the caravan trade from central Africa to Benguela was one provocation of Portuguese imperialism on the plateau in 1890,\textsuperscript{139} the growing Portuguese and mestizo interference in that same trade in 1902 helped to provoke the rising. The war was not simply a war of black against white,
for far more black and mulatto traders were killed by Africans than were Portuguese; further, the Portuguese-led forces against Mutu-ya-Kavela were composed largely of African troops and at least one mestigo officer. Nor was the war simply an attack on Portuguese misrule or lack of rule, or an attack on traders. Behind the rising lay a manifold crisis among the Ovimbundu, involving an intensification of western influences which could not be coped with in the old, established ways.

The war, too, was for something. The leadership could draw from the best of both worlds and was selective. The leaders were for a society based on memories of a kind of golden age under the warrior sova Ekul-kui II, when times seemed better. The new element might have been seen as an African Christianity, in which the new frontiers of opportunity would be probed not by traders but by teachers. This old new vision inspired some African leaders, most especially Mutu-ya-Kavella, at the zenith of African fortunes early in the war.

In the end, the warriors fell before European technology. Yet their effort was remarkable, and they gained the respect of many, including some of their enemies. One of their friends wrote: "... it scarcely seemed possible that these people could bury their differences and rise with one mind in rebellion against the Government."140

Notes

(1) Both authors would like to express their appreciation to the directors and staffs of the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisbon), the Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa, the Biblioteca Nacional (Lisbon), the Arquivo Histórico de Angola (Luanda) and the Houghton Library (Harvard University) for courtesies extended during their respective visits. Ms. Christensen would also like to thank the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, whose support in 1971 made possible research in Angola and Portugal leading to a dissertation to be presented to the Graduate Faculties of Columbia University in 1972-73. For further details on the 1902 rising itself, see below, pp. 20-32.

(2) There are numerous first-hand accounts by Portuguese of the campaigns in the late-19th and early-20th centuries. For a background in military events leading up to 1902, see Gastão de Sousa Dias, ed., Artur de Paiva (Lisbon, Agência Geral das Colônias, 1938). For a more general view of events in the 20th century, see the same author’s Exposição Histórica da Ocupação (Lisboa, Agência Geral das Colônias, 1943), as well as
Ernesto Machado, No Sul de Angola (Lisbon, Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1956); and Mateus Moreno, Fastos Militares da Ocupação do Sul de Angola (Lisbon, Coleção "Pelo Império" No. 108, 1945). These accounts of course emphasize the Portuguese point of view.

(3) This use of the term "Nanu" follows Ralph Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza (Lisbon, Imprensa Beleza, 1944) and José Maria de Lacenda, "Observações sobre a viagem da costa de Angola a costa de Moçambique", (1797) Anais Marítimos e Coloniais, 5 (1844), parte mao official, pp. 188-214. José Redinha, Distribuição Étnica da Província de Angola (Luanda 1961, 1970) indicates another usage, in which Nana is synonymous with Wambe.

(4) Joaquim Rodrigues Graça, "Descrição da Viagem..." (1845), Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia (Lisbon, 9th series, nos. 8-9 (1890), pp. 365-468.

(5) Forms in the language are as follows: an individual person is otcimbundu; people Ovimbundu; the language and general adjective Umbundu. The most recent work on the Umbundu language is Padre José Francisco Valente, Gramática Umbundu, A Língua do Centro de Angola (Lisbon 1964).

(6) For census information, see Repartição de Estatística Geral (Angola), 3º Recenseamento Geral da População, 1960 (Luanda 1964-67), Vol. I "Ethnic". The best maps indicating Angola's indigenous population are José Redinha, Distribuição Étnica; and Instituto de Investigação Científica de Angola, Carta Étnica de Angola (Esboço) (Luanda 1970).

(7) For a background of the Imbangala and their history, see Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison 1966); David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola (Oxford 1966); and Joseph Calder Miller's account of the Imbangala (University of Wisconsin, Madison; Ph. D. thesis, 1971). Older accounts include Henrique Dias de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa ao Muanianva: Etnografia e História ... (Lisbon 1890), perhaps the basic collection of Lunda tradition; and Andrew Battell, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh (London 1613, 1901), an account of the "Jagas" nearer the Nano.


(8) Ralph Delgado in Ao Sul do Cuanza gives an account of the history of the early Portuguese presence in the Nano. Luis Keiling, Quarenta Anos de África (Braga 1934), bases his account of the 18th century settlement and acculturation of outside settlers in the Canda area on locally-collected oral traditions.

(9) For a list of the early capitaes-mores and juizes in the Umbundu king-

(10) Joaquim Lopes de Lima prepared an extensive review of the history of trade and related subjects in his *Ensaios Sobre a Estatística d’Angola e Benguela* (Lisbon 1844), including information on the involvement of officials. For a list of traders resident in Bihe in the 1840’s, see J. R. Graça, "Descrição..."

(11) It might be argued that, following the defeat of Bailundu and Bihe by the Portuguese after the 1770’s war, Bailundu was technically a vassal state. However, capitães-mores and juízes were not consistently present during the 18th and 19th centuries, Bailundu’s policies were of her own making, and the claim of Portuguese sovereignty was meaningless in practice.

(12) An excellent summary of Angolan trade and exports is to be found in J. Lopes de Lima, *Ensaios*. For changes at the end of the 19th century, see Casimiro de Almeida Arez, *Algumas Considerações sobre o Regime Pautal de 1892* (Luanda 1918), including tables.

(13) For statistics on the volume and prices of the slave trade, see Lopes de Lima, *Ensaios*; and Augusto Bastos, "Monographia de Catumbella", Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia (Lisbon), 28 series, no. 8 (August 1910), pp. 18, 25. Serviçães were so-called contract laborers sent to São Tomé, Príncipe, and elsewhere. For a recent history of this commerce and the issues surrounding it, see James Duffy, *A Question of Slavery* (Oxford 1967), which also includes a bibliography of sources. See below, pp. 17-19, for a discussion of the relationship between the serviços trade and the 1902 war.

(14) Domestic slavery among the Ovimbundu has been described by various anthropologists, including Gladwyn Murray Childs, *Kinship and Character of the Ovimbundu* (London 1949, 1969); W. D. Hambly, *The Ovimbundu of Angola* (Chicago 1934); and Adrian C. Edwards, *The Ovimbundu under Two Sovereignties* (London 1962). Other trained anthropologists who have studied and written about the Ovimbundu in the 20th century are the following: Augusto Bastos, "Traços Gerais sobre a Etnografia do Distrito de Benguela", a series of articles in Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia (Lisbon), (1903); Augusto C. Castro Junior, "Indígenas do Bié," *Mensário Administrativo* (Luanda), (September-October 1950);
Mario Fernandes, "Conselho de Huambo, Esquema da Historia do Sambo", Mensário Administrativo, (March–April 1952); Aníbal de Santos Brandão, various articles on the uses and customs of Wambu in Mensário Administrativo, (1949, 1950, 1952); Alexandre Sarmento, O Distrito do Huambo (Lisbon 1954), Para a História do Huambo (Nova Lisboa s.d.), and "Contribuição para o Estudo das Mutilações Étnicas... de Angola (Huambo e Sambo)," Trabalhos de Antropologia e Etnologia (Lisbon 1951); and D. A. Hastings, Ovimbundu Beliefs and Practices (Ph.D. thesis, Kennedy School of Missions, Hartford, Conn. 1933). A summary of the ethnographic material in English can be found in M. McCulloch, The Ovimbundu.

(15) Copies of slave registers taken in Angola’s centers of European population in the 1850’s can be found in the Aquivo Histórico de Angola (Luanda); see, for example, "Núcleo do Governo de Benguela" G (6)–1–81 for the city of Benguela in 1859. For lists of serviços shipped from Novo Redondo, Benguela and other ports, see Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, "Segunda Repartição", Pastas 2–12 (1870’s to 1899); these lists include names, ages, and ethnic origins. Ovimbundu are well represented in both of these sources. See G. M. Childs, Kinship, p. 213 for a discussion of Umbundu mechanisms for selling relatives into slavery.

(16) Lopes de Lima, Ensaios gives an account of the ivory trade in the mid-19th century. For one account of the Tutela mutineers in the Congo and Umbundu relations with them, see Houghton Library of Harvard University, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (hereafter cited as ABCFM) papers West Central Africa ABC.15.1, Vol. 15, #125, Currie to Smith, dated Cisamba, February 20, 1902. Also, J. Vansina, Kingdoms, pp. 227 ff.

(17) The cultivation of beeswax is described in W.D. Hambly, The Ovim bundu: Duane Victor Wain, The Economic Life of the Ovimbundu (M.A. theses Hartford; Kennedy School of Missions, 1941). For export statistics see Lopes de Lima, Ensaios; and Arez, Algumas Considerações.


(19) Documents on events in Bihe in 1890 can be found in G. de Sousa Dias, ed., Artur da Paiva.


(21) For an example of an expedition stymied by dependence on local porterage, see documents in M.A.F. de Oliveira, Angolana, Vol. 1, pp. 257–85. European travel accounts in the 19th century offer glimpses of African organization of the caravan trade, including L. Magyar, Reisen A. da Rocha de Serpa Pinto, How I crossed Africa (London 1881);

(23) For a summary of the materials in English on Umbundu political structure, M. Mc. Culloch, *The Ovimbundu*; Also, A. C. Edwards, *The Ovimbundu*.


(26) Andulo (Ndulu) was an area of Bihe which split off under a newly-independent chief during the later 19th century. Rich in iron deposits and known for its iron trade hoes, its independence was undoubtedly due in part to the increasing activities of its commercial class. See D. V. Wahn, *The Economic Life*; also ABCFM, Correspondence, Vol. 9, # 47, Lee Report on trip to Ondulu, n. d. (about 1893); also Fay letter on Bihe unrest and dissatisfaction with present sova, due to his inadequate protection of chiefs’ trade, ABCFM, Correspondence, Vol. 6, # 199, Kamundongo, August 23, 1887.

(27) On royal trade, see L. Magyar, *Reisen*; D. V. Wahn, *The Economic Life*. Accounts of plundering exist throughout the literature, including ABCFM correspondence, eg. Vol. 6, Nichols letters, # 284, Bailundo, July 24, 1882; and Vol. 1, Transcription of letter to American Mission from Francisco Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral (Governor-General of Luanda), Luanda, November 18, 1884, explaining that Portuguese traders perennially have been raided by the Umbundu sovas. On period of lawlessness upon death of sova, see ABCFM, Correspondence, Vol. 9, General Report of Bailundu Station, W. Stover, May 1, 1892 to May 1, 1893.

(28) C. de A. Sandoval, "Notícia do Sertão do Bailundo" (1837), Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, Series I (1858), pp. 518-21; also see P. de Lacerda, "Observações..."; L. Magyar, *Reisen*. For a summary of the duties of the sova, see G. M. Childs, *Kinship*, pp. 20-23.

(29) On the macotas and the titles and significance of various offices held at the court, see D. A. Hastings, *Ovimbundu Customs*.

(30) Kissama was one important buffer zone between the Ovimbundu and the Portuguese North of the Cuanza and Luanda: Beatrix Heintze, *Paideuma-Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde*, Band 16 (1970) for a recent analysis of Kissama’s position.
(31) For an account of a war during Ekuikui II's reign, see ABCFM, Correspondence, Vol.10, # 168, Currie to Smith, Cisamba, April 10, 1890. For accounts of lawlessness at death of a suva, see references in Ptn. 27 above.


(33) For an account of the 1770's war, see the appended report by the then Governor-General of Angola to C. de A. Sandoval, "Noticia...". This was a much larger war effort than the African raids of the 19th century.

(34) Compare the accounts of Bailundu's borders in "Descrição da Capitania de Benguella..." (1799), Anais Maritimos e Coloniais, 4, 3, parte não oficial (1844), pp. 147-60; and Lopes de Lima, Ensaios. On border wars during the 19th century, consult R. Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza. On the construction of the wagon road from Caconda to Bihe, and the involvement of Boers in the Angolan economy, see correspondence reproduced in M. A. F. de Oliveira, Angolana, pp. 253-56 (for the period of the 1880's); and a personal account by a Bailundu boy from the Protestant mission who travelled by that route in ABCFM, Correspondence, Vol.15, # 133, Kumba's letter transcribed in Currie to Smith, Cisamba, June 6, 1902.

(35) Francisco Cabral de Moncada, A Campanha do Bailundo em 1902 (Losbn 1903, 2nd ed.), p. 24; Alexandre Malheiro, Crónicas do Bihe (Lisbon 1903).


(37) C. de Moncada, A Companha, pp. 9-10.


(39) G. M. Childs, Kinship and Character, p. 211 n.

(40) Ibid.


(42) G. M. Childs, Kinship, pp. 227, 211.


(44) Portugal em Africa, IX, no. 99 (March 1902), pp. 192-192B.


(47) G. M. Childs, Kinship, p. 211.

(49) ABCFM, Vol. 16, W. H. Sanders to Smith, August 29, 1902.

(50) U.S. National Archives, Numerical File, Portugal, Woodside to Barton, August 21, 1908, as cited.


(52) Ibid., p. 88.


(54) ABCFM, Charts of figures in front of Vol. 15; on attendance at Sunday services at Kamondongo in 1902, see Vol. 16, Sanders to Smith, April 7, 1902.

(55) ABCFM, figures in Vol. 15.

(56) Ibid.

(57) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, February 20, 1902.

(58) ABCFM, Vol. 16, Sanders to Smith, December 24, 1900.

(59) On the change-over from English to Portuguese in the American mission's school, see ABCFM, Vol. 17, ¶ 237, Woodside to Smith, Sakanjimba, December 22, 1902.

(60) On the involvement of the English missionary Frederick Stanley Arnot with both the ABCFM stations in Angola and the politics of Bailundu and Bihe, see ABCFM, Vol. 6, ¶ 76, Currie, May 21, 1887; ¶ 110, copy of Arnot's letter to Dr. Judson Smith in Cambridge, Mass., Bailundu, February 17, 1885; and Frederick Stanley Arnot, *Bihe and Garenganze* (London 1893) and *Garenganze* (London 1889).

(61) Ibid.

(62) For an example of the Protestant mission's efforts to bring cases of slave trading and slavery to the attention of the authorities, see ABCFM, Vol. 17, ¶ 12, Stover to Smith, Bailundu, April 2, 1900.

The mission later served as hosts for various American and English travellers in Angola who subsequently wrote exposés on the slave and serviços trades, and forced labor (Nevinson, Ross and Burrt.).


(64) One venture on the part of Umbundu Christians was to use the caravan trade to the lands of Lewanika as a medium of proselytization. See ABCFM, Vol. 14, Documents, ¶ 119, Chissamba Report, June 3, 1902, Currie, on mission to Barotse Valley.

(65) On Currie as a trader, see the complaints of his fellow missionaries that he was compromising their position by being regarded more as a trader than a teacher, ABCFM, Vol. 17, ¶ 17, Stover to Smith,
October 13, 1900. There are numerous other references to this matter in the ABCFM correspondence.

(66) For a Protestant mission point of view more friendly to the Portuguese, see the correspondence of Thomas W. Woodside, esp. ABCFM, Vol. 17, ¶ 233, Skanjimba, June 19, 1902.


(68) Ibid.

(69) The Stovers and the Curries were among the Protestant missionaries especially sympathetic to the African faction in the war.

(70) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Barton, September 4, 1908.

(71) There is a controversy over the question of missionary – especially foreign Protestant – responsibility for the 1902 rising. The "myth" of the missionary role in the rising was fed by rumor, trader's enmity toward the missionaries and their schools, the attitude of some petty officials, and the fact that the American missionaries had played mediating roles between the Portuguese and the Africans, both in 1890 in Bihe and again in 1902 in Ballundu. The controversial nature of the missionary factor and its relationship to the war of 1902 was illustrated in 1908, when the Rev. Wesley M. Stover, a major historical source for information on the war, was "expelled" from Angola upon his departure for home leave and was refused reentry until 1910. See the following for the Protestant missionary controversy and its origins in Angola: Douglas L. Wheeler and René Pélissier, Angola (New York, London 1971). For the "Stover Affair", see U.S. National Archives (Washington, DC) Numerical File, Affairs of Portugal, 3394/20–22 (Copy), Letter, T. W. Woodside to Dr. James L. Barton, August 21, 1908; also see ABCFM Papers (Houghton Library), Vol. 15, Bell to Barton, July 11 and December 28, 1908.

(72) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Sanders to Smith, December 24, 1900.

(73) See above, p. 4. Also, J. Duffy, A Question.


(75) ABCFM, Vol. 16, W. H. Sanders to Smith, August 29, 1902.

(76) Recent secondary analyses in English tend to oversimplify the factors behind the 1902 war by stressing only forced labor as a grievance. And it is necessary to put this grievance in the African context. The principal historic source of comment on this grievance was not the African, but the Anti-Slavery Society and writers like Henry Nevinson, whose principal concern was the study, condemnation and eradication of a specific activity, the practice of slavery. See H. W. Nevinson, A Modern Slavery (New York 1906) for an early account of the forced labor issue.

(77) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, August 21, 1902; and Vol. 16, Sanders to Smith, August 29, 1902.

(78) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, August 21, 1902.

(79) ABCFM, Vol. 17, Bertha Stover to Smith (Bertha Stover Report), July and November 1902.

(80) Ibid.

(81) Malheiro, Crónicas, p. 152.

(82) A. Bastos, "Monografia de Catumbella...", see pp. 251-55 for summary.


(84) Portugal em Africa, X. No. 114 (June 1903), citing letter of March 28, 1902, p. 353; Chatelain, Heli Chatelain, pp. 339-44; ABCFM, Vol. 17; Stover to Smith, August 6, 1901; Vol. 16, Read to Smith, February 10, 1901; Vol. 17, Sanders to Smith, 21 June and August 6, 1901.

(85) Chatelain, Heli Chatelain, pp. 339-44.

(86) Ibid.

(87) Grande Enciclopédia Portuguesa e Brasileira (Lisbon), IV, pp. 13-14.


(90) ABCFM, Vol. 17, Bertha Stover Report. It was noted at the time that the Bailundu ombala dominated the Portuguese fort from a hilltop. Portugal em Africa, IX, (June 1902), p. 425.

(91) ABCFM, Vol. 16, Sanders to Smith, December 24, 1900.

(92) Ibid., Sanders to Smith, April 7, 1902.

(93) For the purpose of this paper, the account of Portuguese military actions in the war has been summarized, as the primary interest of this article is to examine the role and importance of the African element in the rising.

(94) Cabral de Moncada's book is filled with attacks on Teixeira Moutinho; the latter's book, Em Defesa, (In Legitimate Defense) is a personal apologia and reply.

(95) Cabral de Moncada, A Campanha, pp. 92-94.

(96) Ibid., pp. 103-05. Massano de Amorim later published his report,
Relatório Sobre os Acontecimentos do Bailundo (Luanda 1903).

(97) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, August 21, 1902.

(98) Cabral de Moncada, A Campanha, pp. 81, 79.

(99) Chatelain, Heli Chatelain, pp. 339-44.

(100) Ibid.


(102) Cabral de Moncada, A Campanha, pp. 146.

(103) H. W. Nevinson, A Modern Slavery, p. 82; ABCFM, Vol. 17, Bertha Stover Report; Rocha Martins, História, p. 477; for the Kandundu cult, see Merlin Ennis, Umbundu. Folk Tales from Angola (Boston 1962), p. 32 n.

(104) ABCFM, Vol. 17, Stover to Smith, July 2, 1902.

(105) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, June 20, 1902. See T. Ernest Wilson, Angola Beloved (Neptune, New Jersey 1967), p. 74 for a missionary account of an African in Bailundo who travelled to the coast and back during the 1902 war to fetch a case of condensed milk for the Sanderson children at the mission. ABCFM, Vol. 17, Bertha Stover Report, for an account of Mutu-ya-Kavela's attempt to trade rubber for ammunition at the mission.

(106) Cabral de Moncada, A Campanha, p. 122.

(107) Ibid., pp. 31-33; Rocha Martins, História, p. 477.

(108) ABCFM, Vol. 17, Bertha Stover Report. The death of the main African leader was verified when people identified the head and club foot of Mutu-ya-Kavela.

(109) Ibid.

(110) For accounts of the Kandundu cult, see the following: L. S. Tucker, "The Divining Basket of the Ovimbundu", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, LXX (1940), pp. 171-201; D. A. Hastings, Ovimbundu Beliefs; Nevinson, A Modern Slavery, p. 99; Ennis, Umbundu, p. 186; Childs, Kinship, p. 22.


(112) On Quissongo, see Portugal em Africa, IX, no. 110 (February 1903), p. 128 G. For Tchina, see Cabral de Moncada, A Campanha, p. 146.

(113) João Evangelista de Lima Vidal, Por Terras d'Angola (Coimbra 1916), p. 233.

(114) See especially Currie's listing of the peoples participating in the war, ABCFM, Vol. 17, Currie to Smith, August 3, 1902.


(119) Ibid., p. 201.

(120) On Samakaka, see G. M. Childs, *Kinship*, p. 22.


(122) On Samakaka's reputation and his position of opposition to traders, see A. Edwards, *The Ovimbundu*, p. 6, note 29; and ABCFM, Vol. 17, Bertha Stover Report, July–November 1902.


(124) Ibid.


(126) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, November 21, 1902.


(129) ABCFM, Vol. 16, Sanders to Smith, December 2, 1902.


(131) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, August 21, 1902.


(134) Nevinson noted that domestic slavery among the Ovimbundu took five forms, in *A Modern Slavery*, pp. 44–45. In his 1903 visit to Angola, A. G. Gibson said that there appeared to be little difference between contract labor and slavery. See his *Between Cape Town and Loanda* (Cape Town, 1905), p. 89. Later missionary letters from the areas of Bailundu and Bihe confirm the fact that conditions seemed just as bad as previously, within a year or so of the rising. See ABCFM,
Vol. 17, Stover to Smith, March 25, 1903. And later correspondence suggest that the actions of petty officials had again become unbearable for Africans: ABCFM, Vol. 15, Bell to Barton, December 28, 1908; 11 July 1908. See also Duffy, Portuguese Africa, pp. 229, 159-62.


(136) W. Rodney, "European Activity . . .", p. 68.

(137) Despite the fact that no significant military activity occurred in the Bailundu area in 1961, it is clear that attempts to organize action were suppressed by the authorities. At least two recent sources mention, though not in detail, the "alleged plots" discovered in the Bihe-Bailundu area in 1961. See Wheeler and Pélissier, Angola, map on p. 185, where one plot west of the Cuanza in Bihe is indicated, and p. 192; and Sid Gilchrist, Angola Awake (Toronto 1968), pp. 53 ff. Also see J. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, p. 111.


(140) ABCFM, Vol. 15, Currie to Smith, November 21, 1902.